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Delusions of Adequacy? Examining the Case for 
Finding the United States Adequate for Cross-Border 
EU-U.S. Data Transfers 
Christopher Wolf  
This Article explores the European Union (EU) adequacy 
mechanism for assessing cross-border data flows, and highlights 
where U.S. law aligns with and differs from the EU approach to 
privacy. Following the Introduction, Part I explains how the EU 
adequacy mechanism works and how it has been applied in practice. 
Parts II and III then review the case for and against U.S. privacy law 
being deemed adequate under the EU privacy framework. The Article 
concludes with some thoughts on how cross-border data flows can be 
managed as both the United States and EU contemplate new privacy 
laws and a new transatlantic trade agreement. 
INTRODUCTION 
Following the revelations by Edward Snowden about the nature 
and extent of NSA surveillance in the summer of 2013, officials in 
the EU mounted an aggressive war of words directed at the United 
States and questioned the commitment of its government and 
corporations to personal privacy.
1
 The openly hostile challenge to 
U.S. privacy marked a dramatic change in tone and substance in the 
EU‘s approach to cross-border cooperation on privacy. A little over a 
 
  Christopher Wolf is a director of the global Privacy and Information Management 
practice at Hogan Lovells US LLP, and is the founder and co-chair of the Future of Privacy 
Forum think tank. In the spring of 2013, following the announcement of EU-U.S. 
negotiations towards a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), he was a lead 
organizer of the Coalition for Privacy and Free Trade. Special thanks to Hogan Lovells 
colleagues Paul Otto and Julian Flamant for their substantial assistance in the preparation of 
this Article. 
 1. See Christopher Wolf, The Brussels and Warsaw Privacy Peace Talks, PRIVACY 
PERSPECTIVES (Aug. 29, 2013), https://www.privacyassociation.org/privacy_perspectives/post/ 
the_brussels_and_warsaw_privacy_peace_talks. 
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year before, there appeared to be a thaw in the transatlantic privacy 
relationship: 
The United States and the European Union clearly share a 
commitment to promoting the rights of individuals to have 
their personal data protected and to facilitating interoperability 
of our commercial data privacy regimes. 
The European Union and the United States are global leaders 
in protecting individual freedoms, including privacy, while 
at the same time fostering innovation and trade that are so 
critical to the world economy, notably in the present times. 
Stronger transatlantic cooperation in the field of data 
protection will enhance consumer trust and promote the 
continued growth of the global Internet economy and the 
evolving digital transatlantic common market.
2
 
In March 2012, the European Commission Directorate-General for 
Justice, Fundamental Rights, and Citizenship (―DG Justice‖) hosted a 
conference on ―Privacy and Protection of Personal Data‖ that was 
held simultaneously in Washington, D.C., (at the U.S. Institute of 
Peace) and in Brussels, in which senior officials of the Commission, 
the Obama administration, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), 
NGOs, and corporate representatives participated. As reflected in the 
agenda
3
 and in the Joint Statement of European Commission Vice 
President Reding and then-U.S. Commerce Secretary Bryson, the 
gathering was intended to explore the ―common principles‖ of the 
two jurisdictions, heralded as ―partners,‖ with a focus on 
―compatibility, compliance and accountability at global scale.‖4 The 
borderless nature of the Internet and the global nature of digital trade 
 
 2. Press Release, Joint European Statement on Data Protection by European Commission 
Vice-President Viviane Reding and U.S. Secretary of Commerce John Bryson (Mar. 19, 2012), 
available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-12-192_en.htm [hereinafter EU-U.S. 
Joint Statement]. 
 3. Press Release, European Commission, EU Conference: Privacy and Protection of 
Personal Data (Mar. 19, 2012), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/files/eu-
us-data-programme_en.pdf; see also id. 
 4. EU-U.S. Joint Statement, supra note 2.  
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was recognized as a strong motivation to identify common and 
compatible approaches to the protection of personal data.
5
 
Yet, the jointly acknowledged ―shared commitment‖ and ―joint 
leadership,‖ and the need for ―stronger transatlantic cooperation‖ on 
privacy, have not changed the innate opinion of the relevant 
European authorities—exacerbated by the Snowden episode—that 
the U.S. privacy framework is ―inadequate,‖ an opinion that hinders 
or encumbers cross-border data flows and, ultimately, international 
trade and economic growth.
6
 In truth, the United States has never 
formally requested an adequacy determination (beyond that for the 
limited EU-U.S. Safe Harbor framework
7
), likely because of the well-
understood outcome: request denied. 
Just over a year after the European Commission‘s March 2012 
―charm offensive‖ at the Institute of Peace session, in which a thaw 
in EU-U.S. privacy relations seemed possible, FTC Commissioner 
Julie Brill went to Brussels to reprise the favorable comparison of the 
EU and U.S. privacy regimes.
8
 The speech she gave came at a time 
when the proposed EU Regulation was entering crucial consideration 
in the European Parliament and when European perceptions of 
significant (negative) differences between the EU and U.S. regimes 
were intensifying.
9
 Commissioner Brill reminded Europeans there is 
a ―central reality that lies at the interface between EU and U.S. 
privacy law: while many commenters dwell on the significant 
differences between the EU and U.S. privacy regimes, I believe it is 
important to recognize that we also have much in common.‖10 
Indeed, both the U.S. and EU privacy frameworks are based on the 
―Fair Information Practice Principles‖ (FIPPs), ―first articulated in a 
comprehensive manner in the United States Department of Health, 
 
 5. EU-U.S. Joint Commitments On Privacy And Protection Of Personal Data, EDRI-
GRAM (Mar. 28, 2012), http://www.edri.org/edrigram/number10.6/eu-us-privacy-commitments. 
 6. U.S. INT‘L TRADE COMM‘N, DIGITAL TRADE IN THE U.S. & GLOBAL ECONS., PART 1 
5–12 (Jul. 2013), available at http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4415.pdf. 
 7. See infra note 128. 
 8. Frances Robinson, U.S. to EU: U.S. Data Law is Brill, WALL ST. J. BLOGS (Apr. 19, 
2013, 11:45 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/brussels/2013/04/19/u-s-to-eu-u-s-data-law-is-brill/. 
 9. FTC’s Brill Addresses EU on Privacy, INTERNET ASS‘N (Apr. 23, 2013), http:// 
internetassociation.tumblr.com/post/48689421851/ftcs-brill-addresses-eu-on-privacy. 
 10. Julie Brill, Remarks to the Mentor Group for EU-U.S. Legal-Economic Affairs 1 
(Apr. 16, 2013), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/brill/130416mentorgroup.pdf. 
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Education, and Welfare‘s seminal 1973 report entitled Records, 
Computers and the Rights of Citizens, and following which ―a canon 
of fair information practice principles has been developed by a 
variety of governmental and inter-governmental agencies,‖11 such as 
the privacy guidelines issued in 1980 by the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).
12
 The EU and 
United States have taken divergent approaches to implementing the 
FIPPs.
13
 In the United States, where privacy interests are balanced 
with the right to free expression, and in recognition of the fact that—
as a practical matter—not every piece of personal information can be 
protected and policed, the framework provides the highest levels of 
protection for sensitive personal information—such as health,14 
financial,
15
 and children‘s16 information. In addition, targeted 
enforcement actions against bad (or negligent) actors—principally by 
the FTC—have created a ―common law‖ of what is expected from 
business when it comes to the collection, use, and protection of 
personal information.
17
 A web of state data security and data security 
breach notification laws, as well as enforcement actions at the state 
level in the United States, have added to the protections for personal 
data consistent with the FIPPs.
18
 
 
 11. FTC, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 48 n.27 (Jun. 1998), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/priv-23a.pdf. 
 12. OECD, GUIDELINES ON THE PROT. OF PRIVACY & TRANSBORDER FLOWS OF 
PERSONAL DATA (1980), available at http://www.oecd.org/internet/ieconomy/oecdguidelines 
ontheprotectionofprivacyandtransborderflowsofpersonaldata.htm. 
 13. Christopher Wolf & Winston Maxwell, So Close, Yet So Far Apart: the EU and U.S. 
Visions of a New Privacy Framework, ANTITRUST 8 (summer 2012), available at http://law 
.duke.edu/sites/default/files/images/centers/judicialstudies/Visions_New_Privacy_ Framework.pdf. 
 14. See, e.g., the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 26, 29 and 42 
U.S.C.), and its implementing regulations. 
 15. See, e.g., the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) 
(codified in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.), and its implementing regulations. 
 16. See, e.g., the Children‘s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–
07, and its implementing regulations. 
 17. Daniel Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and The New Common Law of Privacy, 
114 COLUM. L. REV. 23 (forthcoming 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers 
.cfm?abstract_id=2312913.  
 18. See Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy on the Books and on the 
Ground, 63 STAN. L. REV. 247, 292 (2011). 
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The U.S. privacy framework is far from perfect. New technologies 
for the collection, combination, and sharing of personal data allow 
some privacy-insensitive businesses to act inconsistently with 
consumer expectations, or to act with little to no transparency, and 
even well-intentioned businesses sometimes push the envelope in 
terms of data collection and use. 
The EU privacy law regime purports to deal with the U.S. 
imperfections by providing substantive protections for all personal 
data. In reality, however, the broad protections are not matched by 
EU enforcement of those protections. The European Union‘s 1995 
Data Protection Directive
19
 (the ―Directive‖) lays out prescriptive 
rules regarding the processing—including collection, storage, use, 
and disclosure—of all personal data.20 The EU enacted the Directive 
following the creation of the EU, in large part to harmonize its 
Member States‘ laws to facilitate the transfer of personal data among 
Member States while ensuring similar levels of data protection.
21
 The 
level of EU protection is in furtherance of Article 8 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which provides: 
1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data 
concerning him or her. 
2. Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes 
and on the basis of the consent of the person concerned or 
some other legitimate basis laid down by law. 
 
 19. See Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, available at http://ec.europa.eu/ 
justice/policies/privacy/docs/95-46-ce/dir1995-46_part1_en.pdf [hereinafter Council Directive 
95/46]. 
 20. See Council Directive 95/46, supra note 19, art. 3(1) (―This Directive shall apply to 
the processing of personal data wholly or partly by automatic means, and to the processing 
otherwise than by automatic means of personal data which form part of a filing system or are 
intended to form part of a filing system.‖). 
 21. See Council Directive 95/46, supra note 19, Recital 8 (―Whereas, in order to remove 
the obstacles to flows of personal data, the level of protection of the rights and freedoms of 
individuals with regard to the processing of such data must be equivalent in all Member States; 
whereas this objective is vital to the internal market but cannot be achieved by the Member 
States alone, especially in view of the scale of the divergences which currently exist between 
the relevant laws in the Member States and the need to coordinate the laws of the Member 
States so as to ensure that the cross-border flow of personal data is regulated in a consistent 
manner that is in keeping with the objective of the internal market as provided for in Article 7a 
of the Treaty; whereas Community action to approximate those laws is therefore needed.‖). 
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3. Everyone has the right of access to data which has been 
collected concerning him or her, and the right to have it 
rectified. 
4. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by 
an independent authority.
22
 
A major difference between the U.S. and EU privacy regimes is 
the way in which each regulates cross-border data flows. In the 
United States, enforcement of privacy protections across borders has 
―relied on holding those who transfer data accountable for its safe-
keeping, and self-regulatory codes of conduct to protect the privacy 
of personal information that flows across borders.‖23 The EU, on the 
other hand, has a more formal approach. Article 25 of the Directive 
generally prohibits transfers of personal data to a third country unless 
that third country ―ensures an adequate level of protection.‖24 
The United States‘ approach to cross-border transfers is consistent 
with the OECD‘s 1980 privacy guidelines that do not require 
evaluating the ―adequacy‖ of third countries‘ privacy practices for 
purposes of data transfer, and that specifically address the need for 
countries to facilitate cross-border data transfers.
25
 The Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) Privacy Framework, issued in 2005, 
covers a wide range of privacy protections but does not involve the 
process of making adequacy determinations. The APEC Privacy 
Framework instead opts for an accountability principle: ―When 
personal information is to be transferred to another person or 
organization, whether domestically or internationally, the personal 
information controller should obtain the consent of the individual or 
 
 22. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1, available 
at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/text_en.pdf. 
 23. Brill, supra note 10, at 5. 
 24. Council Directive 95/46, supra note 19, art. 25(1) (―The Member States shall provide 
that the transfer to a third country of personal data which are undergoing processing or are 
intended for processing after transfer may take place only if, without prejudice to compliance 
with the national provisions adopted pursuant to the other provisions of this Directive, the third 
country in question ensures an adequate level of protection.‖). 
 25. OECD, supra note 12, para. 20 (―Member countries should also ensure that 
procedures for transborder flows of personal data and for the protection of privacy and 
individual liberties are simple and compatible with those of other Member countries which 
comply with these Guidelines.‖ (emphasis added)); see also id. para. 20, explanatory 
memorandum paras. 71–73 (discussing the need for international cooperation). 
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exercise due diligence and take reasonable steps to ensure the 
recipient person or organization will protect the information 
consistently with these Principles.‖26  
That is not to say that the adequacy approach exists solely in 
Europe. A 2011 review of worldwide privacy laws revealed that 
twenty-five of the twenty-nine non-European countries with data 
privacy laws had ―border control data export limitations,‖ although 
the review noted the strength of those limitations ―varies a great deal, 
and [the limitations] are not yet in force in the laws of Malaysia and 
Hong Kong.‖27 As one scholar noted, it is no surprise that the 
adequacy approach has been adopted in many countries because the 
Directive has had a significant worldwide impact in encouraging ―the 
rise of omnibus legislation throughout the EU and most of the world‖ 
modeled on the Directive (including its adequacy mechanism).
28
 
Both the United States and Europe are considering major 
overhauls to their respective privacy regimes. In January 2012, the 
European Commission unveiled a proposed regulation
29
 to supplant 
the existing Directive (the ―Proposed Regulation‖). Unlike a 
directive, which requires each EU Member State to pass 
implementing legislation, an EU regulation is directly binding on all 
Member States.
30
 Thus, the proposal seeks to further harmonize EU 
data privacy law by establishing uniform data protection 
requirements across all EU Member States. In addition, the Proposed 
Regulation might also add new privacy rights, such as the so called 
 
 26. APEC, PRIVACY FRAMEWORK 28 (2005), available at http://publications. 
apec.org/publication-detail.php?pub_id=390. 
 27. Graham Greenleaf, Do Not Dismiss ‘Adequacy’: European Data Privacy Standards 
Are Entrenched, 114 PRIVACY L. & BUS. REP. 16–17 (Dec. 2011) [hereinafter Greenleaf, Do 
Not Dismiss]. 
 28. Paul M. Schwartz, The EU-U.S. Privacy Collision: A Turn to Institutions and 
Procedures, 126 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013); see also id. (attributing the spread to 
―harmonization networks,‖ because worldwide privacy policymaking ―has not been led 
exclusively by the EU, but has been a collaborative effort marked by accommodation and 
compromises‖). 
 29. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free 
Movement of Such Data, COM (2012) 11 final (Jan. 25, 2012), available at http://ec.europa 
.eu/justice/data-protection/document/review2012/com_2012_11_en.pdf [hereinafter Proposed 
Regulation]. 
 30. See EUROPEAN UNION, REGULATIONS, DIRECTIVES & OTHER ACTS (last visited Sept. 
4, 2013), http://europa.eu/eu-law/decision-making/legal-acts/index_en.htm. 
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―right to be forgotten,‖ by which individuals could request 
information about themselves be removed from the Internet 
entirely.
31
 
In February 2012, President Obama unveiled his Consumer 
Privacy Bill of Rights as part of his administration‘s comprehensive 
blueprint to enhance U.S. privacy protections.
32
 The Privacy Bill of 
Rights calls for baseline privacy legislation largely modeled on the 
FIPPs.
33
 Commissioner Brill remarked in her 2013 Brussels speech 
that the Bill of Rights reflects that ―there is always room for 
improvement,‖ which is why she supports such comprehensive 
privacy legislation even while recognizing the strength of the existing 
U.S. framework.
34
 Separately, several agencies have recently updated 
the regulations associated with the privacy laws they enforce. For 
example, in December 2012, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
updated the regulations protecting children‘s privacy.35 And in 
January 2013, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) 
released a substantial update to health privacy regulations.
36
 
Along with attempting to reshape their individual privacy 
frameworks, the United States and EU are working to establish a new 
trade agreement. In his 2013 State of the Union, President Obama 
announced the United States and EU would begin talks on a 
comprehensive Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP).
37
 A first round of TTIP negotiations took place in 
Washington D.C. on July 8–12. The second round of TTIP 
negotiations were set to take place in Brussels, Belgium, in October 
 
 31. Id. at art. 17; see also infra note 107 and accompanying text. 
 32. THE WHITE HOUSE, CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY IN A NETWORKED WORLD: A 
FRAMEWORK FOR PROTECT. PRIVACY & PROMOTING INNOVATION IN THE GLOBAL DIGITAL 
ECON. (2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/privacy-final.pdf. 
 33. Id. at 47 (The Consumer Bill of Rights). 
 34. Brill, supra note 10, at 6. 
 35. See Children‘s Online Privacy Protection Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. 3972 (Jan. 17, 2013) (to 
be codified at 16 C.F.R. part 312). 
 36. Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and Breach Notification 
Rules Under the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act and the 
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act; Other Modifications to the HIPAA Rules; Final 
Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. 5566 (Jan. 25, 2013) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. parts 160 and 164). 
 37. President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Feb. 12, 2013), available at 
http://www.c-span.org/uploadedFiles/Content/Documents/State-of-the-Union-2013.pdf. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol43/iss1/13
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2013.
38
 Because modern trade invariably involves the transfer of 
personal data, the level of U.S. privacy protections and U.S. 
adequacy as determined by EU law likely will be a focus of the 
negotiations, as the parties attempt to develop a durable trade 
discipline facilitating the free flow of data while protecting privacy.
39
 
Against this backdrop of evolving frameworks and trade 
negotiations, now is the time for earnest discussion about how U.S. 
privacy law compares to EU standards. This discussion should take 
into account the inherent cultural, political, and constitutional 
differences between the two legal systems. The United States and EU 
have the opportunity to work towards interoperability and mutual 
respect by recognizing how both of their approaches to privacy 
satisfy the core privacy protections embodied in international 
standards. 
I. HOW THE ADEQUACY MECHANISM WORKS 
The EU Data Protection Directive generally prohibits transfers of 
personal data to a third country unless that third country ―ensures an 
adequate level of protection.‖40 Article 26(1) lists six exceptions to 
the general requirement that a third country ensure an adequate level 
of protection.
41
 Article 26(2) allows EU Member States to authorize 
 
 38. In Focus: Transatlantic Trade and Inv. P’ship (TTIP), EURO. COMM‘N,  http://ec 
.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ttip/ (last visited Sept. 4, 2013). 
 39. See, e.g., EU Officials Want U.S. to Bolster Data Privacy Protections in Trade Talks, 
INSIDE U.S. TRADE (Feb. 21, 2013), http://insidetrade.com/Inside-US-Trade/Inside-U.S.-Trade-
02/22/2013/eu-officials-want-us-to-bolster-data-privacy-protections-in-trade-talks/menu-id-172 
.html; Christopher Wolf, Trade Law and Privacy Law Come Together, IAPP PRIVACY PERSP. 
(Feb. 21, 2013), http://www.privacyassociation.org/privacy_perspectives/post/trade_law_and_ 
privacy_law_come_together. 
 40. Council Directive 95/46, supra note 19, art. 25(1) (―The Member States shall provide 
that the transfer to a third country of personal data which are undergoing processing or are 
intended for processing after transfer may take place only if, without prejudice to compliance 
with the national provisions adopted pursuant to the other provisions of this Directive, the third 
country in question ensures an adequate level of protection.‖). 
 41. Article 26(1) includes the following six exceptions: 
a. the data subject has given his consent unambiguously to the proposed 
transfer; or 
b. the transfer is necessary for the performance of a contract between the data 
subject and the controller or the implementation of precontractual 
measures taken in response to the data subject‘s request; or 
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transfers where ―appropriate contractual clauses‖ are in place to 
provide ―appropriate safeguards with respect to the protection of the 
privacy and fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals and as 
regards the exercise of the corresponding rights.‖42 
The Directive, under Article 29, establishes a ―Working Party on 
the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of 
Personal Data‖ (the ―Article 29 Working Party‖ or the ―Working 
Party‖).43 The Article 29 Working Party is responsible for, among 
other things, giving the European Commission its opinion on the 
level of protection in third countries.
44
 Additionally, the European 
Commission may issue a decision that a third country ensures an 
adequate level of protection, which is binding on all EU Member 
States.
45
 
The Directive provides very broad guidance on how to assess 
whether a third country ensures an adequate level of protection: 
The adequacy of the level of protection afforded by a third 
country shall be assessed in the light of all the circumstances 
surrounding a data transfer operation or set of data transfer 
operations; particular consideration shall be given to the nature 
of the data, the purpose and duration of the proposed 
processing operation or operations, the country of origin and 
country of final destination, the rules of law, both general and 
sectoral, in force in the third country in question, and the 
 
c. the transfer is necessary for the conclusion or performance of a contract 
concluded in the interest of the data subject between the controller and a 
third party; or 
d. the transfer is necessary or legally required on important public interest 
grounds, or for the establishment, exercise or defence [sic] of legal claims; 
or 
e. the transfer is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data 
subject; or 
f. the transfer is made from a register which according to laws or regulations 
is intended. 
Council Directive 95/46, supra note 19, art. 26(1). 
 42. Id. art. 26(2).  
 43. Id. art. 29, 30. 
 44. Id. art. 30(1)(b). 
 45. Id. art. 25(6). 
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professional rules and security measures which are complied 
with in that country.
46
 
The Article 29 Working Party has issued two documents further 
discussing how adequacy of third countries should be assessed.
47
 The 
Working Party states that Article 25 reflects a ―case by case approach 
whereby the assessment of adequacy is in relation to individual 
transfers or individual categories of transfers.‖48 Thus, the Working 
Party takes the position that even where a third country is generally 
deemed adequate, any given data transfer could still be prohibited.
49
 
Furthermore, there is nothing to stop the European Commission or an 
EU Member State from revoking an adequacy determination at any 
time. 
The Article 29 Working Party has provided additional guidance 
for making adequacy determinations. The Working Party‘s broad 
conclusion is that ―any meaningful analysis of adequate protection 
must comprise the two basic elements: the content of the rules 
applicable and the means for ensuring their effective application.‖50 
The Working Party identified six core data protection content 
principles
51
 and three core procedural/enforcement requirements,
52
 
―compliance with which could be seen as a minimum requirement for 
 
 46. Id. art. 25(2). 
 47. See ARTICLE 29 WORKING PARTY, WP 4, FIRST ORIENTATIONS ON TRANSFERS OF 
PERSONAL DATA TO THIRD COUNTRIES—POSSIBLE WAYS FORWARD IN ASSESSING ADEQUACY 
(1997) [hereinafter WP 4]; ARTICLE 29 WORKING PARTY, WP 12, WORKING DOCUMENT: 
TRANSFERS OF PERSONAL DATA TO THIRD COUNTRIES: APPLYING ARTICLES 25 & 26 OF THE 
EU DATA PROTECTION DIRECTIVE (1998) [hereinafter WP 12]. 
 48. WP 12, supra note 47, at 26. 
 49. See id. (noting that determinations that a third country generally ensures an adequate 
level of protection ―would be ‗for guidance only,‘ and therefore without prejudice to cases 
which might present particular difficulties‖). 
 50. Id. at 5. 
 51. The content principles are (1) the purpose limitation principle, (2) the data quality and 
proportionality principle, (3) the transparency principle, (4) the security principle, (5) the rights 
of access, rectification, and opposition, and (6) restrictions on onward transfers. Id. at 6. The 
1998 Working Document also lists three additional principles for certain types of processing: 
sensitive data, direct marketing, and automated individual decision. Id. at 6–7. 
 52. The procedural/enforcement principles are (1) to deliver a good level of compliance 
with the rules, (2) to provide support and help to individual data subjects in the exercise of their 
rights, and (3) to provide appropriate redress to the injured party where rules are not complied 
with. Id. at 7. 
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protection to be considered adequate.‖53 No other guidance has been 
issued since 1998, so any further observations about what constitutes 
an adequate level of protection must be adduced from the small 
number of adequacy determinations issued by the Article 29 Working 
Party and European Commission.
54 
As of this Article‘s writing, the European Commission has issued 
thirteen favorable adequacy determinations.
55
 The Commission has 
recognized Andorra, Argentina, Australia, Canada, Faeroe Islands, 
Guernsey, Israel, Isle of Man, Jersey, New Zealand, Switzerland, and 
Uruguay as ensuring adequate protection for all personal data 
transfers from the EU to those countries.
56
 Additionally, the 
Commission has recognized adequate protection for some types of 
transfers to Canada
57
 and the United States.
58
 
It is worth noting, however, that nineteen European countries that 
are not part of the EU appear to enjoy a de facto adequacy 
determination. These countries have acceded to both Convention 
108
59
 and the Additional Protocol,
60
 which together require 
signatories to have laws that meet all the key requirements of the EU 
Directive.
61
 Thus, as one scholar notes, ―no such country has 
bothered to apply for a[n] adequacy finding, even though they are the 
 
 53. Id. at 5. 
 54. See, e.g., supra note 47. 
 55. See Comm’n Decisions on the Adequacy of the Prot. of Personal Data in Third 
Countries, EURO. COMM‘N, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/ document/international-
transfers/adequacy/index_en.htm (last updated Jul. 16, 2013). Separately, the European Union 
has entered into agreements with Australia and the United States to allow the transfer of 
Passenger Name Record data by air carriers. 
 56. Id.  
 57. The Commission has recognized as adequate Canada‘s handling of Passenger Name 
Record (PNR) data and transfers to recipients subject to the Personal Information Protection 
and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA). See Commission Decision 2006/253, 2006 O.J. (L 
91) 49 (PNR); Commission Decision 2002/2, 2002 O.J. (L 2) 13 (PIPEDA).  
 58. The Commission has recognized that the Safe Harbor Framework ensures an adequate 
level of protection. See infra note 131 and accompanying text. 
 59. Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of 
Personal Data, Eur. T.S. No. 108 (Jan. 28, 1981) [hereinafter Convention 108].  
 60. Additional Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to 
Automatic Processing of Personal Data, Regarding Supervisory Authorities and Transborder 
Data Flows, Eur. T.S. No. 181 (Nov. 8, 2001) [hereinafter Additional Protocol]. 
 61. See, e.g., Convention 108, supra note 59, ch. II (laying out privacy safeguards and 
data subject rights akin to EU Directive); Additional Protocol, supra note 60, art. 1 (requiring 
DPA); id. art. 2 (requiring adequacy determinations for nonparties to Convention 108). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol43/iss1/13
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2013]  Delusions of Adequacy 239 
 
 
most likely countries to be successful,‖ because ―there is, in practice, 
simply no need for an adequacy declaration.‖62 And ―the EU has in 
most cases awaited requests from third countries to initiate the 
process‖ of adequacy determinations.63 
Other factors have further contributed to the low number of 
published adequacy determinations. Several commentators have 
noted that the EU could be ―more pro-active and more transparent 
about its processes.‖64 For example, the EU does not generally 
publish negative or unfavorable adequacy determinations.
65
 The 
Article 29 Working Party has never made a negative adequacy 
opinion public, and the only published negative opinions come from 
external consultants.
66
 The pool of adequacy opinions providing 
guidance therefore is quite limited. 
A review of some of the published adequacy determinations 
reveals some trends and potential inconsistencies in how the 
adequacy mechanism has been employed in practice. For example, 
New Zealand is the most recent country to be deemed to ensure an 
adequate level of protection.
67
 Professor Greenleaf notes, however, 
that the Article 29 Working Party opinion on New Zealand‘s 
adequacy ―found seven instances of where New Zealand‘s content 
principles were not fully ‗adequate.‘‖68 Most noteworthy among these 
is that the Article 29 Working Party had concerns with New 
Zealand‘s restrictions on onward transfers to other countries (i.e., 
New Zealand‘s adequacy mechanism) and concluded that New 
Zealand law did not comply fully with the EU Directive on this 
point.
69
 Yet the Article 29 Working Party seemed to downplay this 
concern due to New Zealand‘s ―geographical isolation,‖ ―the size and 
 
 62. See Greenleaf, Do Not Dismiss, supra note 27, at 17. 
 63. Alex Boniface Mukalilo, Data Protection Regimes in Africa: Too Far from the 
European ‘Adequacy’ Standard?, INT‘L DATA PRIVACY L., Nov. 2012, at 8. 
 64. Greenleaf, Not Entirely Adequate, infra note 68, at 17.  
 65. Id. 
 66. Mukalilo, supra note 63, at 8. 
 67. Commission Decision 2013/65, 2013 O.J. (L 28) 12. 
 68. Graham Greenleaf, Not Entirely Adequate But Far Away: Lessons from How Europe 
Sees New Zealand Data Protection, PRIVACY L. BUS. REP. 8 (July 2011) [hereinafter Greenleaf, 
Not Entirely Adequate]. 
 69. ARTICLE 29 WORKING PARTY, WP 182, OP. 11/2011 ON THE LEVEL OF PROTECTION 
OF PERSONAL DATA IN NEW ZEALAND 9–10 (2011). 
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the nature of its economy,‖ and the low probability that ―significant 
volumes of EU-sourced data‖ would be transferred to third 
countries.
70
 
In effect, the Article 29 Working Party‘s opinion on New 
Zealand‘s adequacy might highlight a tale of two standards. The 
decision reflects an underlying rationale that ―[i]t will be relatively 
rare that personal data on EU citizens ends up in New Zealand, so a 
good deal of tolerance of variation from the core principles 
previously set out by the Working Party is permitted by them in 
delivering an adequacy opinion.‖71 Meanwhile, ―[i]n a country like 
India, where outsourcing of the processing of European data is of 
large scale, as are other forms of business and travel involving 
personal data, different considerations are likely to apply.‖72 
Professor Greenleaf concludes that the Article 29 Working Party‘s 
opinion reflects ―significant pragmatic preparedness on the part of the 
Working Party.‖73 But the opinion might also illustrate a different 
standard for large- versus small-scale data processing countries when 
seeking adequacy determinations. 
Argentina‘s favorable adequacy determination illustrates other 
nuances in the EU‘s approach to adequacy. Argentina passed its 
comprehensive privacy law in October 2000, issued an 
implementing/clarifying regulation in December 2001, and then 
requested an adequacy determination from the EU in January 2002.
74
 
In October 2002, the Article 29 Working Party released its favorable 
adequacy opinion,
75
 and in June 2003, the European Commission 
decided Argentina ensured an adequate level of protection.
76
 
The Article 29 Working Party gave a favorable opinion on 
Argentina‘s adequacy despite substantial concerns with its procedural 
 
 70. Id. at 10 (―In reality, given the geographical isolation of New Zealand from Europe, 
its size and the nature of its economy, it is unlikely that New Zealand agencies will have any 
business interest in sending significant volumes of EU-sourced data to third countries.‖). 
 71. Greenleaf, Not Entirely Adequate, supra note 68, at 9. 
 72. Id. at 3. 
 73. Id. at 2. 
 74. ARTICLE 29 WORKING PARTY, WP 63, OP. 4/2002 ON THE LEVEL OF PROTECTION OF 
PERSONAL DATA IN ARGENTINA 2–3 (2002). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Commission Decision 2003/490, 2003 O.J. (L 168) 19. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol43/iss1/13
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2013]  Delusions of Adequacy 241 
 
 
and enforcement mechanisms.
77
 For instance, the Working Party 
expressed concern that the Data Protection Authority (DPA) was not 
guaranteed to be independent and lacked jurisdiction over all data 
controllers and processors.
78
 Moreover, the Working Party noted that 
it relied heavily on the Argentinean government‘s assurances with 
respect to how the law was being implemented.
79
 Thus, the Working 
Party concluded by stressing that its opinion was ―drafted on the 
basis of these assumptions and explanations and in the absence of any 
substantial experience with the practical application of the 
legislation.‖80  
This conclusion stands in stark contrast to more recent adequacy 
opinions commissioned by the European Commission. For example, 
Burkina Faso was among four African countries that recently sought 
adequacy determinations from the EU.
81
 The advisory opinion on 
Burkina Faso‘s adequacy ―refrained from giving its conclusion 
whether Burkina Faso provides an ‗adequate level of protection of 
personal data.‘‖82 It based this decision in part on the opinion that 
―the existence of actual enforcement mechanisms is an important part 
of the criteria to meet before being possibly considered as a country 
offering an adequate protection in the sense of article 25.‖83 Yet the 
Article 29 Working Party offered a favorable opinion for Argentina at 
a time when Argentina‘s DPA had issued no significant guidance and 
pursued no enforcement. Indeed, Argentina‘s low number of 
enforcement actions to date, coupled with insight gleaned from 
discussions with Argentinian practitioners, suggest that Argentina 
may still lack effective enforcement mechanisms in practice—even if 
effective mechanisms exist on paper. 
Another issue with the adequacy mechanism is the potential for 
the process to become politicized. The Article 29 Working Party 
itself recognized the potential for political tensions surrounding 
adequacy determinations, noting that ―some third countries might 
 
 77. See ARTICLE 29 WORKING PARTY, supra note 69, at 17. 
 78. ARTICLE 29 WORKING PARTY, supra note 69, at 14. 
 79. Id. at 17. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Mukalilo, supra note 63, at 1–2. 
 82. Id. at 4. 
 83. Id. at 5 (quoting advisory opinion). 
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come to see the absence of a finding that they provided adequate 
protection as politically provocative or at least discriminatory, in that 
the absence of a finding is as likely to be the result of their case not 
having been examined as of a judgment on their data protection 
system.‖84 According to Mukalilo, this is why the EU generally 
avoids releasing negative adequacy opinions.
85
 More troubling, 
although ultimately of no effect, was Ireland‘s objection in 2010 to 
the adequacy determination for Israel. After Israel received a 
favorable adequacy opinion from the Article 29 Working Party, 
Ireland officially objected and delayed the European Commission‘s 
decision.
86
 Ireland raised its objection ostensibly based on minor 
concerns with the Israeli protections for manual data processing and 
the DPA‘s independence.87 But Ireland admitted to making an 
objection for reasons wholly unrelated to privacy, as it was outraged 
by the use of fake Irish passports by alleged Israeli agents in a 
targeted killing.
88
 Use of the adequacy mechanism to achieve 
unrelated political ends could threaten the legitimacy of the system 
and undermine third countries‘ confidence that their privacy regimes 
are being evaluated purely on the merits. 
We are in the early days of modern international data privacy 
law—privacy law that addresses the use of technology—and it is 
understandable why the form of a nation‘s privacy law regime has 
been used as a convenient surrogate for adequacy. However, now that 
multiple national regimes have had the chance to mature, and 
regulators in Europe have had a decade or more to observe them, it‘s 
reasonable and desirable for the Article 29 Working Party to apply 
the full-factors approach that EU law allows them to use in 
recommending adequacy.
89
  
 
 84. WP 12, supra note 47, at 27. 
 85. Mukalilo, supra note 63, at 8. 
 86. Laurence Peter, Ireland Delays EU Deal with Israel on Data Transfers, BBC NEWS 
(Sept. 3, 2010), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11176926. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. The European Commission itself has had very few opportunities directly to consider 
adequacy and to bring the full range of stakeholder interests to bear in consideration of 
adequacy. 
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II. THE CASE FOR U.S. ADEQUACY 
It has been said that the United States and England are two 
countries separated by a common language. Something similar can be 
said with respect to the United States and EU when it comes to 
privacy: both the United States and Europe fundamentally agree on 
the need for privacy protections and the core tenets of what those 
protections look like.
90
 The differences are largely in form, not 
substance. 
Privacy law worldwide has evolved from a set of core principles. 
As discussed earlier, the 1980 OECD privacy guidelines identified 
eight FIPPs to guide all data collection, use, and disclosure.
91
 The 
OECD guidelines were formally ratified by twenty-four OECD 
member countries, including the United States and many European 
nations.
92
 These eight FIPPs have been highly influential in the 
development of privacy laws and regulations worldwide.
93
 The FIPPs 
form the foundation of almost every nation‘s information privacy 
protections, including both the U.S. and the European Union privacy 
regimes.
94
 Historically, however, the EU and the United States have 
taken divergent approaches to implementing the FIPPs. 
In the United States, the legal framework for information privacy 
has focused on providing protections tailored to specific areas of 
concern, such as health records and children‘s personal information.95 
This sectoral approach, with its focus on sensitive personal 
information, has deep roots in American law. In large part, it reflects 
 
 90. THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 32, at 49 (Appendix B: Comparison of the Consumer 
Privacy Bill of Rights to Other Statements of the Fair Information Practice Principles). 
 91. See OECD, supra note 12, paras. 7–14 (identifying the eight FIPPs as collection 
limitation, data quality, purpose specification, use limitation, security safeguards, openness, 
individual participation, and accountability). 
 92. See OECD, LIST OF OECD MEMBER COUNTRIES—RATIFICATION OF THE 
CONVENTION ON THE OECD, available at http://www.oecd.org/general/listofoecdmember 
countries-ratificationoftheconventionontheoecd.htm (last visited Sept. 4, 2013). 
 93. DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY LAW FUNDAMENTALS 2013 
208–10 (2013).  
 94. See, e.g., John W. Kropf, Independence Day: How to Move the Global Privacy 
Dialogue Forward, BLOOMBERG BNA PRIVACY & SEC. L. REP., Jan. 2009, at 62 (―The 
Guidelines have been highly influential, and are at the heart of most countries‘ privacy 
legislation . . . .‖).  
 95. See supra notes 14, 16 and accompanying text.  
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that privacy interests are balanced with competing interests, such as 
the right to free speech and respect for free-market solutions. 
The United States passed one of the very first privacy laws back 
in 1970, ten years before the OECD privacy guidelines, when 
Congress enacted the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA).
96
 At the 
time, there was widespread concern over how credit reporting 
agencies would use the vast troves of information becoming available 
through automated processing of credit transactions.
97
 (Remember 
that computing was still in its infancy, and thus the ability to 
computerize record-keeping was just starting to revolutionize 
society.) As a result, Congress passed the FCRA to ensure the 
accuracy, fairness, and privacy of personal information assembled by 
the credit reporting agencies. 
The next major U.S. privacy law came as a result of the Nixon 
administration‘s privacy abuses. Mere months after Nixon‘s 
resignation, Congress enacted the Privacy Act of 1974 to apply the 
FIPPs to U.S. federal agencies‘ collection, storage, use, and 
disclosure of the personal information of U.S. citizens.
98
 
Starting in the 1980s, Congress enacted a series of privacy laws 
targeting specific sectors. These laws often passed in response to 
publicized incidents demonstrating a lack of privacy protections in a 
certain sector. For example, Congress enacted the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act of 1986
99
 in response to concerns with 
electronic surveillance technologies. Then, in 1988, Congress enacted 
the Video Privacy Protection Act
100
 after a reporter published the 
video rental records of Robert Bork, at the time a Supreme Court 
nominee.
101
 
The 1990s saw the passage of several blockbuster privacy laws in 
the United States. Congress enacted laws addressing health privacy, 
 
 96. Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, tit. VI, 84 Stat. 1114, 1128 
(1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–81x). 
 97. Lacey Fosburgh, 23 to Study Computer ‘Threat,’ N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1970, at 38.  
 98. Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (1974) (codified as amended 
at 5 U.S.C. § 552a). 
 99. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 
(1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–22). 
 100. Video Privacy Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 100-618, 102 Stat. 3195 (1988) (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2710). 
 101. Editorial, Video Viewers’ Privacy, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 26, 1987, at 10A. 
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financial privacy, and children‘s privacy.102 In each area, Congress 
enacted legislation that also called for the appropriate federal 
agencies to enact accompanying regulations fleshing out the details 
of the law. For example, Congress passed the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) with minimal 
detail regarding health privacy protections. But the law called on the 
HHS to enact a detailed Privacy Rule.
103
 This hybrid law-and-
regulation approach has allowed Congress to pass high-level privacy 
guidance for a specific sector, and to give the federal agency with 
sector-specific subject matter expertise the authority to elaborate the 
nuances and address the low-level implementation details. 
Perhaps the most significant legislative action on privacy in the 
United States, however, has come through state data breach 
notification statutes. California passed the first such law
104
 in the 
early 2000s, and now almost every state, commonwealth, and 
territory in the United States has a similar statute.
105
 Generally 
speaking, these laws require entities to notify affected individuals 
and/or regulators whenever entities experience a data breach. A data 
breach can include losing a computer or flash drive containing 
personal information, having an employee steal personal information 
to commit identity theft, or experiencing an attack that results in 
hackers gaining access to company databases. 
The effect of these laws cannot be overstated. According to the 
Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, since 2005, over 3,700 breaches 
involving over 600 million compromised records have been reported 
under these state laws.
106
 Breach notification laws have resulted in 
greater transparency into entities‘ privacy and security practices, as 
well as raising consumer interest in privacy protections. There are 
 
 102. See supra notes 14–16. 
 103. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 
§ 263(iii). 
 104. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.29 (2012). 
 105. See NAT‘L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, STATE SEC. BREACH 
NOTIFICATION LAWS, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/telecom/security-breach-notification-
laws.aspx (last visited May 1, 2013) (―Forty-six states, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto 
Rico and the Virgin Islands have enacted legislation requiring notification of security breaches 
involving personal information.‖). 
 106. See Chronology of Data Breaches, PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www 
.privacyrights.org/data-breach (updated Sept. 22, 2013) (providing a list of disclosed breaches). 
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obvious costs associated with a data breach, such as the money spent 
investigating and reporting the incident, and the costs associated with 
providing affected individuals with credit monitoring services.
107
 
Companies suffering a data breach also pay a reputational penalty, as 
consumers are less likely to trust the company with their business in 
the future.
108
 The result has been an incredible increase in attention 
paid to preventing data breaches, with a resulting increase in privacy 
protections across the board. 
United States privacy protections, however, are not limited to 
specific laws and regulations. The FTC has played an increasingly 
active role in shaping what privacy protections are expected for all 
U.S. businesses. The FTC Act gives the FTC authority to regulate all 
―unfair or deceptive practices or acts in or affecting commerce.‖109 
Starting in the 2000s, the FTC began to invoke this authority to 
govern companies‘ privacy practices. Commissioner Brill has stated 
that ―privacy protection is ‗mission critical‘‖ at the FTC.110  
The FTC has acted through two mechanisms. First, the FTC has 
brought scores of enforcement actions concerning privacy.
111
 The 
earliest actions focused on holding companies to the promises 
included in their online privacy policies; violation of a privacy 
promise constituted a deceptive practice under the FTC Act.
112
 
Increasingly, however, the FTC has invoked its authority to 
affirmatively state what privacy practices are reasonably expected for 
all companies. Recent FTC enforcement actions have resulted in 
 
 107. See PONEMON INST., 2011 COST OF DATA BREACH STUDY (2012), available at 
http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/about/media/pdfs/b-ponemon-2011-cost-of-data-breach-
us.en-us.pdf?om_ext_cid=biz_socmed_twitter_facebook_marketwire_linkedin_2012Mar_world 
wide__CODB_US (noting that the average breach results in a cost of approximately $200 per 
compromised record). 
 108. VIRGINIA CITRANO, ADVISEN, THE REPUTATIONAL RISK OF DATA BREACH 11 (Sept. 
2012), available at http://corner.advisen.com/pdf_files/Reputational_Risk_Data_Breach_2012 
NAS.pdf. 
 109. See 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2013). 
 110. Brill, supra note 10, at 2. 
 111. For a listing of the FTC‘s enforcement actions, see FTC BUREAU OF CONSUMER 
PROT., LEGAL RESOURCES, http://business.ftc.gov/legal-resources/all/35 (last visited May 1, 
2013). 
 112. See FTC v. Twitter Inc., No. 092 3093. 
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settlements whereby the company agrees to implement a 
comprehensive and auditable privacy program.
113
 
Second, and complementary to its enforcement efforts, the FTC 
has increasingly sought to provide companies guidance on privacy 
best practices. To that end, the FTC has published a series of reports, 
most recently on issues regarding privacy in mobile apps.
114
 In March 
2012, the FTC also published a fairly comprehensive guide to privacy 
best practices.
115
 Moreover, the FTC has convened workshops to 
promote broad discussions regarding privacy issues.
116
 These 
workshops bring together the regulators, company and industry 
representatives, and privacy advocates to debate the appropriate 
privacy safeguards that should be considered best practices. These 
workshops often result in publication of reports or guidelines 
summarizing the FTC‘s advice—which then become the baseline by 
which the FTC brings future enforcement actions. 
The net impact of the FTC‘s two mechanisms has been to raise 
the privacy floor. Companies doing business in the United States are 
now expected to have published privacy policies and privacy 
programs—even though no federal law imposes these requirements 
on the vast majority of businesses (with the exception of companies 
operating in highly regulated sectors, such as healthcare). And the 
thousands of companies that have self-certified to the Safe Harbor 
Framework
117
 (which allows personal data to be transferred from the 
EU to the U.S., as discussed below)
118
 have both imposed these 
 
 113. Shayndi Raice & Julian Angwin, Facebook ‘Unfair’ on Privacy, WALL ST. J., Nov. 
30, 2011, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203441704577068400 
622644374.html (―As part of the settlement, Facebook agreed to submit to independent privacy 
audits every two years for the next 20 years.‖). 
 114. See FTC, MOBILE PRIVACY DISCLOSURES: BUILDING TRUST THROUGH 
TRANSPARENCY (Feb. 2013), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2013/02/130201mobileprivacy 
report.pdf. 
 115. See FTC, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE: 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUS. & POLICYMAKERS (2012), available at http://www.ftc.gov/ 
os/2012/03/120326privacyreport.pdf. 
 116. See, e.g., The Big Picture: Comprehensive Online Data Collection, FTC (Dec. 6, 
2012), available at http://ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/bigpicture/. 
 117. See, e.g., EU-U.S. Joint Statement, supra note 2 (noting ―over 3,000 companies have 
self-certified‖ to the Safe Harbor Framework). 
 118. See infra notes 128–130 and accompanying text. 
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requirements on themselves and subjected themselves to FTC 
enforcement. 
There are also significant extra-legal forces operating in the 
United States that contribute to providing broad privacy protections. 
For example, the past fifteen years has seen an explosion in 
companies hiring Chief Privacy Officers (CPOs). In 2000, the few 
companies that had created CPO positions actually issued press 
releases announcing their actions.
119
 Now there are thousands of CPO 
positions at companies across the United States. The existence of a C-
level position focused on privacy elevated corporate America‘s focus 
on privacy and resulted in substantial increases in time and resources 
devoted to privacy protections. 
The privacy profession has been further enhanced through 
professional associations. A professional organization known as the 
International Association of Privacy Professionals (IAPP) was 
formed in 2000 to provide a venue for CPOs to discuss privacy issues 
and share best practices.
120
 In early years, the IAPP had conferences 
where numerous CPOs would gather to share knowledge. For the 
2013 Global Privacy Summit,
121
 over 2,000 people were in 
attendance. The organization now boasts more than 10,000 members 
in the United States alone, and provides numerous certifications for 
individuals seeking to establish their credentials as privacy 
professionals in the marketplace. 
There are also numerous privacy lawyers—working with 
policymakers, engineers, and others—engaged in privacy 
compliance advice, representation, advocacy, and scholarship. 
Privacy law articles have influenced privacy professionals and 
policymakers alike. The field of privacy law itself originated with 
the seminal law review article by Warren and Brandeis on The Right 
to Privacy.
122
 Additionally, privacy advocacy groups have increased 
 
 119. See, e.g., Press Release, IBM, IBM Names Harriet P. Pearson as Chief Privacy Officer 
(Nov. 29, 2000), available at http://www-03.ibm.com/press/us/en/pressrelease/1464.wss. 
 120. See About the IAPP, INT‘L ASS‘N PRIVACY PROF‘L, https://www.privacyassociation 
.org/about_iapp (last visited Sept. 4, 2013). 
 121. See Global Privacy Summit 2013, INT‘L ASS‘N PRIVACY PROF‘L, https://www 
.privacyassociation.org/events_and_programs/global_privacy_summit_2013 (last visited May 
1, 2013). 
 122. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 
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their watchdog role to play a significant role in prompting 
enforcement. Many FTC enforcement actions start with complaints 
filed by these very advocacy groups.
123
  
Finally, litigation has served as a backstop to keep pressure on 
companies to implement and maintain robust privacy programs. 
These days, a company announcement of a data breach or media 
reports on a privacy slip-up frequently result in the filing of class 
action lawsuits within days of the news. While these class action suits 
on the whole have not been generally successful in establishing 
liability and damages,
124
 they have provoked numerous settlements 
from companies averse to public litigation with customers. The cases 
increase the bottom line costs that companies weigh in deciding how 
they allocate their resources, and that weighing means increased 
attention to privacy programs. 
Berkeley professors Ken Bamberger and Deirdre Mulligan have 
extensively researched the role that extra-legal forces play in 
protecting privacy. In their landmark study of privacy ―on the 
ground,‖ they interviewed several CPOs to assess the state of 
privacy protections in the United States.
125
 Their findings suggest 
that the extra-legal forces described above, coupled with the various 
laws and regulations on the books, have resulted in privacy 
becoming more embedded into U.S. corporate culture and business 
operations.
126
 More importantly, their research suggests that 
 
193 (1890). 
 123. See, e.g., Facebook Privacy, EPIC.ORG, http://epic.org/privacy/facebook/ (last visited 
Sept. 18, 2013) (―The settlement follows from complaints filed by EPIC and other consumer 
and privacy organizations in 2009 and 2010 over Facebook‘s decision to change its users‘ 
privacy settings in a way that made users‘ personal information more widely available to the 
public and to Facebook‘s business partners.‖); Byron Acohido, Group Urges FTC Action on 
Google Privacy, USA TODAY, Feb. 8, 2012, available at http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/tech/ 
news/story/2012-02-08/google-privacy-ftc/53014496/1 (―A lengthy FTC deceptive practices 
probe of Buzz, sparked by an EPIC complaint, resulted in Google agreeing to a consent order 
that prohibits the company from misrepresenting its privacy practices.‖). 
 124. But see Des Hogan, Michelle Kisloff, Christopher Wolf & James Denvil, Regulators 
and Plaintiffs’ Lawyers Are Ready to Pounce on Privacy and Data Security Missteps: A Guide 
to Limiting Corporate Risk, BLOOMBERG BNA PRIVACY & SEC. L. REP., 12 PVLR 586 (Apr. 8, 
2013), available at http://www.hldataprotection.com/files/2013/04/PDFArtic.pdf (noting that 
―[t]he plaintiffs‘ bar has won a string of recent victories in privacy class actions, which could 
light a path for others seeking to bring similar cases‖). 
 125. See Bamberger & Mulligan, supra note 18. 
 126. See id. at 314. 
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formalistic reviews of privacy ―on the books‖ might substantially 
underestimate the strength of a third country‘s privacy protections 
overall. 
III. SO WHY ISN‘T THE UNITED STATES CONSIDERED ADEQUATE? 
Despite the various layers contributing to robust privacy 
protections in the United States, the EU continues to view the U.S. 
privacy framework as inadequate under EU law—although the issue 
has never been squarely addressed, as the United States has never 
applied for a finding of adequacy, and the EU has never stated that it 
has denied or would deny any U.S. application. When the Directive 
entered into force in 1998, however, it was widely accepted that the 
United States lacked adequate privacy protections to qualify as 
adequate under EU law.
127
 Thus, the United States and EU promptly 
began negotiating a way for U.S. businesses to be able to engage in 
certain international data transfers involving EU personal data. The 
U.S. goal was to create a ―safe harbor‖ under which some U.S. 
businesses could receive EU personal data.
128
 The challenge, 
however, was to bridge the gap between two very different 
approaches to privacy protections. 
It took two years of negotiating, but eventually both sides reached 
an agreement that was acceptable to all. The result was the Safe 
Harbor Framework.
129
 The Framework requires eligible companies to 
certify their compliance with seven broad principles: (1) notice, 
(2) choice, (3) restrictions on third-party transfers, (4) security for 
personal data, (5) data integrity, (6) individual access rights, and 
 
 127. See, e.g., ARTICLE 29 WORKING PARTY, WP 15, OP. 1/99 CONCERNING THE LEVEL OF 
DATA PROTECTION IN THE UNITED STATES & THE ONGOING DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION & THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 2 (1999) (―[T]he Working Party 
takes the view that the current patchwork of narrowly-focused sectoral laws and voluntary self-
regulation cannot at present be relied upon to provide adequate protection in all cases for 
personal data transferred from the European Union.‖).  
 128. U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Overview, EXPORT.GOV, http://export.gov/safeharbor/eu/eg_ 
main_018476.asp (last visited Sept. 4, 2013) (―In order to bridge these differences and provide 
a streamlined and cost-effective means for U.S. organizations to satisfy the Directive‘s 
―adequacy‖ requirement, the U.S. Department of Commerce in consultation with the European 
Commission developed a ―safe harbor‖ framework.‖). 
 129. The U.S. government maintains all documentation associated with the EU-U.S. Safe 
Harbor Framework online, available at http://export.gov/europeanunion/index.asp. 
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(7) submission to the FTC‘s jurisdiction for enforcement purposes.130 
In 2000, the European Commission recognized the Safe Harbor 
Framework ensured an adequate level of protection under the EU 
Directive,
131
 and the Safe Harbor Framework has facilitated cross-
border data transfers for thousands of companies in the intervening 
years. 
Only companies subject to the jurisdiction of the FTC are eligible 
for participation in the Safe Harbor (as the FTC is the agency charged 
with enforcing Safe Harbor principles).
132
 Thus, broad swaths of U.S. 
commerce, including transportation companies, communication 
common carriers, certain regulated financial services firms, and non-
profits, are not eligible to participate in the Safe Harbor. 
After the 9/11 attacks, the United States and EU entered into a 
separate arrangement providing for the sharing of airline passenger 
information involving EU personal data.
133
 This second agreement 
allowed for the transfer of Passenger Name Records to U.S. 
government authorities for anti-terrorism purposes.
134
 
These are the two primary agreements existing between the 
United States and EU regarding international data transfers.
135
 As 
previously noted, the United States has never formally sought a full 
adequacy determination, but it is no secret the EU sees major 
shortcomings in the U.S. regime. The principal perceived 
shortcomings are that the EU generally disfavors a sector-by-sector 
approach, instead viewing comprehensive legislation as the superior 
method to ensure privacy protections.
136
 Additionally, the EU 
 
 130. See infra note 132. 
 131. See Commission Decision 2000/520, 2000 O.J. (L 215) 7.  
 132. Safe Harbor Enforcement, EXPORT.GOV, http://export.gov/safeharbor/eu/eg_main_ 
018481.asp (last updated Jan. 30, 2009). 
 133. See Commission Decision 2007/551, 2007 O.J. (L 298) 29. 
 134. Id. art. 1(1) (―For this purpose, this agreement sets forth the responsibilities of the 
Parties with respect to the conditions under which PNR may be transferred, processed and used, 
and protected.‖). 
 135. There have been other discussions and understandings reached regarding specific 
types of transactions, such as data transfers for anti-terrorism purposes, but these are beyond the 
scope of this Article. 
 136. See, e.g., Peter Schaar, Transatlantic Free Trade Zone? But Only When the U.S. 
Provide Improved Data Protection!, GERMAN FED. COMM‘R DATA PROT. FREEDOM INFO. 
BLOG (Feb. 13, 2013), http://www.bfdi.bund.de/EN/PublicRelations/SpeechesAndInter 
views/blog/TransatlanticFreeTradeZone.html?nn=408870 (―Looking into data protection in the 
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considers the lack of an independent data protection authority in the 
United States to be a serious shortcoming.
137
 
Some in the EU also criticize the effectiveness of the Safe 
Harbor.
138
 These criticisms arise despite the European Commission‘s 
continuing support for the Safe Harbor Framework‘s adequacy, 
which was reaffirmed even after the release of the Proposed 
Regulation.
139
 And evidence suggests the Safe Harbor Framework 
has played a key role ―in raising privacy awareness and acceptance of 
privacy protection in the United States.‖140 
The sectoral approach that has garnered European criticism has 
some advantages that might be underappreciated in Europe. For 
example, U.S. privacy law has been tailored across sectors to provide 
varying levels of protection appropriate for the sensitivity and use of 
personal information. This flexibility also permits quicker changes in 
response to new threats to privacy, without having to establish rigid 
protections that prevent flexibility. As to health privacy in the United 
States, for example, a detailed and robust framework exists under 
HIPAA.  
 
U.S. the diagnosis is not assuring. Generally applicable rules for data protection in the private 
sector still are lacking. Measures taken in this area present the outlook of a more or less 
incomplete patchwork situation. The data protection rules in the 50 U.S. states are mostly 
inconsistent and incomplete. Only in certain sectors, such as health care, we can find data 
protection rules at all.‖). 
 137. EU Comm’r criticises U.S. for the data prot. negotiations, EURO. DIGITAL RIGHTS, 
http://www.edri.org/book/export/html/2493 (―Reding wants to obtain limitations of retained 
data, a strict ban on the transfer of data to other countries and asks for an independent data 
protection supervisor to be appointed by the U.S. for the supervision of the authorities‘ use of 
citizen data, as there is in Europe.‖). 
 138. Id. 
 139. See EU-U.S. Joint Statement, supra note 2 (―[T]he United States and the European 
Union reaffirm their respective commitments to the U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Framework. This 
Framework, which has been in place since 2000, is a useful starting point for further 
interoperability.‖). Note, however, that the official Rapporteur for the proposed Regulation 
proposed there be a regular reevaluation of the Safe Harbor arrangement. See JAN PHILIPP 
ALBRECHT, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, DRAFT REPORT ON THE PROPOSAL FOR A REGULATION 
OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT & OF THE COUNCIL ON THE PROT. OF INDIVIDUAL WITH 
REGARD TO THE PROCESSING OF PERSONAL DATA & ON THE FREE MOVEMENT OF SUCH DATA 
(GENERAL DATA PROT. REGULATION) 144–47 (2013), available at http://www.europarl.europa. 
eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/libe/pr/922/922387/922387en.pdf. 
 140. Damon Greer, Safe Harbor—A Framework that Works, 1 INT‘L DATA PRIVACY L. 
143, 147 (2011). 
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The EU believes the United States affords too much 
governmental access to personal data, and that also affects its view 
of the U.S. privacy framework.
141
 These concerns are rooted in the 
powers authorized by the U.S. Patriot Act, which was passed after 
the 9/11 attacks.
142
 It is true the Patriot Act provides the U.S. 
government with authority to access personal data in certain 
situations.
143
 But the EU is wrong to paint the U.S. government‘s 
access as exceptional. A legal review of ten different countries 
across the globe assessed their governments‘ level of access to 
information stored in the cloud.
144
 The survey included the United 
States, several European countries, Canada, Australia, and Japan.
145
 
The results were clear: all ten countries permitted their governments 
similar levels of access to data stored in the cloud in the interests of 
national security and law enforcement.
146
 And several countries 
actually enabled entities voluntarily to share such information with 
the government, without legal protections; the United States was not 
one of them.
147
 
Finally, the EU criticism of the lack of a centralized enforcement 
authority for privacy in the United States should not be dispositive. 
The FTC has broad but not unlimited jurisdiction to police privacy 
violations in the United States. Influential scholars have made the 
case that enforcement efforts in the United States are very strong.
148
 
 
 141. Letter from Jacob Konstamm, Chairman, Article 29 Working Party, to Viviane 
Reding, Commissioner, Directorate-General for Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship 
(Aug. 13, 2013), available at http://www.hldataprotection.com/files/2013/08/20130813_letter_ 
to_vp_reding_final_en1.pdf. 
 142. 50 USC § 1861—Access to certain business records for foreign intelligence and 
international terrorism investigations (2001). 
 143. Id. (a)1. 
 144. See Winston Maxwell & Christopher Wolf, Hogan Lovells White Paper on A Global 
Reality: Governmental Access to Data in the Cloud (2012), available at http://m.hoganlovells. 
com/files/News/c6edc1e2-d57b-402e-9cab-a7be4e004c59/Presentation/NewsAttachment/a17af 
284-7d04-4008-b557-5888433b292d/Revised%20Government%20Access%20to%20Cloud%2 
0Data%20Paper%20(18%20July%2012).pdf.  
 145. Id. at 6–12. 
 146. Id. 
 147. See id. at 13 (presenting a chart showing countries that allowed voluntary disclosure 
of personal data in response to informal governmental requests). 
 148. See, e.g., Bamberger & Mulligan, supra note 18; Brill, supra note 10, at 6. 
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This is especially so when one considers the robust and increasing 
enforcement activity at the state level.
149
 
Complicating matters, however, is the potential for greater 
separation between the U.S. and EU privacy regimes once the EU 
adopts the Proposed Regulation. The Proposed Regulation includes 
several elements not reflected in current or proposed U.S. law. For 
example, the Proposed Regulation would give individuals a ―right to 
be forgotten,‖ which would allow individuals to compel deletion of 
their personal data.
150
 In the United States, such a right would likely 
run afoul of the First Amendment. Additionally, the Proposed 
Regulation would provide a ―right to data portability.‖151 Finally, the 
Proposed Regulation would expand the privacy rules‘ jurisdictional 
reach directly to companies processing EU personal data outside the 
EU.
152
 U.S. privacy law, however, remains restricted to governing 
companies located within the United States, and instead makes the 
companies that transfer personal information outside the United 
States accountable for the actions of their third parties operating 
abroad. 
The day after President Obama announced the new trade 
negotiations with the EU, the U.S. Trade Representative highlighted 
―the issue of cross-border data flows as one of those next-
generational issues that should be addressed‖ during the 
negotiations.
153
 That same day, an EU data protection official noted 
that the trade negotiations would present an opportune time to 
 
 149. See, e.g., Privacy in the Digital Age, NAT‘L ASS‘N ATT‘Y GEN., http://www.naag. 
org/privacy-in-the-digital-age.php (last visited May 1, 2013) (describing the 2013 nationwide 
focus by state attorneys general on addressing privacy issues). 
 150. Proposed Regulation, supra note 29, art. 17 (providing in enumerated circumstances 
that a ―data subject shall have the right to obtain from the controller the erasure of personal data 
relating to them and the abstention from further dissemination of such data‖). 
 151. Proposed Regulation, supra note 29, art. 18 (providing data subjects with the right to 
obtain a copy of their personal data and transfer it to another system).  
 152. Proposed Regulation, supra note 29, art. 3(2) (―This Regulation applies to the 
processing of personal data of data subjects residing in the Union by a controller not established 
in the Union, where the processing activities are related to: (a) the offering of goods or services 
to such data subjects in the Union; or (b) the monitoring of their behaviour.‖).  
 153. Ron Kirk, U.S. Trade Representative, Transcript of Press Conference (Feb. 13, 2013), 
available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/pressreleases/2013/february/transcript-
briefing-us-eu. 
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―broaden the insufficient level of data protection in the [United 
States].‖154 
The EU critique of the U.S. approach to privacy overlooks 
fundamental structural differences between the two legal regimes. 
For example, the United States has had to balance its robust privacy 
protections against strong constitutional protection for free 
expression. At times, the constitutional protections of the First 
Amendment may trump otherwise strong privacy interests.
155
 In the 
EU, by contrast, the balance between the rights to privacy and free 
expression is less clear—but wherever the exact line falls, the 
protections for free expression in the EU do not rise to the level of 
First Amendment protections.
156
  
While many EU Member States employ a civil law system, the 
United States has a rich history of relying on the common law. 
Indeed, the FTC‘s ―enforcement efforts have established what some 
scholars call ‗the common law of privacy‘ in the United States.‖157 
CONCLUSION 
Despite their similar origins in the FIPPs, the U.S. and EU privacy 
regimes have evolved in different ways over the past forty years. But 
their differences do not necessarily suggest a lack of equivalence or 
 
 154. Schaar, supra note 136. 
 155. See, e.g., Florida Star v. B.L.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989) (holding a Florida statute 
prohibiting the publication of names of victims of sexual offenses violated the First 
Amendment); Jacob Gershman, When the First Amendment Trumps Privacy Concerns, WALL 
ST. J. L. BLOG (Apr. 10, 2013), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2013/04/10/when-the-first-amend 
ment-trumps-privacy-concerns/ (noting that a magazine‘s publication of recordings from private 
meetings likely is protected by the First Amendment); see also Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 
S. Ct. 2653 (2011) (holding a Vermont statute restricting the sale, disclosure, and use of 
prescription records violated the First Amendment). 
 156. See, e.g., William Echikson, Judging Freedom of Expression at Europe’s Highest 
Court, GOOGLE EURO. BLOG (Feb. 26, 2013), http://googlepolicyeurope.blogspot.com/2013/ 
02/judging-freedom-of-expression-at.html (discussing litigation currently pending before the 
European Court of Justice involving Spanish citizens‘ efforts to have Google remove search 
results about them); Peter Fleischer, The Saga Continues . . . Now to the Italian Supreme Court, 
PRIVACY . . . ? (Apr. 17, 2013), http://peterfleischer.blogspot.com/2013/04/the-saga-continues 
now-to-italian.html (discussing the continuing legal case involving Italy‘s prosecution of 
Google executives for violating Italian privacy law by not taking preemptive steps to block a 
user-uploaded video containing bullying from being posted). 
 157. Brill, supra note 10, at 3 (citing, inter alia, Bamberger & Mulligan, supra note 18). 
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interoperability to satisfy common goals. As Commissioner Brill 
notes, ―[A]lthough the U.S. may for historic reasons approach 
privacy through our different legal tradition—one that uses a 
framework approach, backed up by strong enforcement—I believe 
this approach achieves many of the same goals as those embraced by 
EU data protection authorities.‖158  
Why, then, has the U.S. approach been consistently viewed as 
providing an inadequate level of protection by EU officials? The 
reason seems to be the EU‘s emphasis on the form of a third country's 
privacy framework, rather than its substance. This trend is evidenced 
in the Article 29 Working Party‘s published adequacy opinions, as 
well as several statements by EU data protection officials, in 
emphasizing the differences in the U.S. approach. 
As noted previously, however, there is substantial common 
ground between the two approaches, and many differences can be 
attributed to fundamental characteristics of the respective regimes. As 
Commissioner Brill observes, ―We will not erase the differences in 
our privacy regimes. And . . . we need not erase them, because we 
have plenty of common ground for mutual recognition of our 
different, but equally effective, privacy frameworks.‖159 In many 
other contexts, legal interoperability is achieved by recognizing these 
fundamental differences and embracing a flexible approach to 
managing cross-border issues. 
Furthermore, the Article 29 Working Party‘s reliance to date on 
form as a surrogate for effectiveness of a nation‘s privacy regime 
overlooks the robust privacy protections currently available in the 
United States, as well as the different constitutional and legal 
structures in place. The Safe Harbor Framework has demonstrated 
one possible approach to mutual recognition and interoperability, and 
indeed the United States and EU have continued to reaffirm their 
commitment to that approach even as both sides consider revisions to 
their respective privacy frameworks.
160
 The United States and EU 
 
 158. Id. at 6. 
 159. Id. 
 160. See EU-U.S. Joint Statement, supra note 2 (―In line with the objectives of increasing 
trade and regulatory cooperation outlined by our leaders at the U.S.-EU Summit, the United 
States and the European Union reaffirm their respective commitments to the U.S.-EU Safe 
Harbor Framework.‖). 
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jointly referred to the Safe Harbor Framework in March 2012 as ―a 
useful starting point for further interoperability.‖161  
The TTIP presents a golden opportunity to embrace 
interoperability outright and recognize solutions that give credit to 
the different ways the two systems achieve substantially similar aims. 
Perhaps foreshadowing the TTIP negotiations, the EU-U.S. joint 
statement in March 2012 included the following proclamation: 
As the EU and the United States continue to work on 
significant revisions to their respective privacy frameworks 
over the next several years, the two sides will endeavor to find 
mechanisms that will foster the free flow of data across the 
Atlantic. Both parties are committed to work towards solutions 
based on non-discrimination and mutual recognition when it 
comes to personal data protection issues which could serve as 
frameworks for global interoperability that can promote 
innovation, the free flow of goods and services, and privacy 
protection around the world.
162
 
Part of that effort to find solutions rooted in mutual recognition 
should be a fresh look at the overall adequacy of the U.S. framework. 
More flexible approaches to cross-border data transfers could 
provide robust privacy protections while facilitating free trade and 
the free flow of information. As Commissioner Brill noted, ―Given 
the complexity of international data flows and different legal regimes 
around the globe, I think that providing more flexibility for cross-
border data transfers could enhance privacy protection, spur 
innovation and trade, and help us achieve interoperability between 
our two systems.‖163 Whether that flexibility arises within the 
framework of the EU adequacy approach, the TTIP trade agreement, 
or alternative measures, the end result should be the same: it is time 
for the United States and EU to reach a workable long-term solution 
to facilitating cross-border data transfers that both protects privacy 
and promotes international economic growth. 
 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Brill, supra note 10, at 5–6. 
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